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When presented with a claim that contradicts their intuitions, do children seize opportunities to 
empirically verify such claims or do they simply acquiesce to what they have been told? To 
answer this question, we conducted a replication of Ronfard, Chen, and Harris (2018, conducted 
in the People’s Republic of China) in two countries with distinct religious and political histories 
(Study 1: Belarus, N = 74; Study 2: Turkey, N = 79). Preschool children were presented with 
five, different-sized Russian dolls and asked to indicate the heaviest doll. All children selected 
the biggest doll. Half of the children then heard a (false) claim (i.e., that the smallest doll was the 
heaviest), contradicting their initial intuition. The remaining children heard a (true) claim (i.e., 
that the biggest doll was the heaviest), confirming their initial intuition. Belarusian and Turkish 
preschoolers typically endorsed the experimenter’s claim no matter whether it had contradicted 
or confirmed their initial intuition. Next, the experimenter left the room, giving children an 
opportunity to check the experimenter’s claim by picking up the relevant dolls. Belarusian and 
Turkish preschoolers rarely explored the dolls, regardless of the type of testimony they received 
and continued to endorse the counter-intuitive testimony they received. Furthermore, in Study 2, 
Turkish preschoolers continued to endorse smallest = heaviest even when doing so could have 
cost them a large reward. In sum, across two different cultural contexts, preschool children 
endorsed a counter-intuitive claim and did not spontaneously seek evidence to test it. These 
results confirm and extend those of Ronfard et al. (2018).  
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Preschoolers in Belarus and Turkey accept an adult’s counter-intuitive claim and do not 
spontaneously seek evidence to test that claim 
Humans rely heavily on the accumulated knowledge of their community. Indeed, 
testimony from other people makes it possible to gather information quickly and to learn about 
ideas and entities we could not discover on our own. However, other people are not always 
reliable. They may be ill-informed or ill-intentioned. As a result, individuals have to be 
epistemically vigilant. They cannot trust everything they are told (Harris, 2012; Sperber et al., 
2010). Much recent work has focused on how young children make such evaluations (for 
reviews see: Harris et al., 2018; Landrum, Eaves, & Shafto, 2015; Mills, 2013; Sobel & Kushnir, 
2013). However, this prior work has focused almost exclusively on children’s immediate 
response to testimony: their explicit endorsement or rejection of a given claim (but see Guerrero, 
Sebastián-Enesco, Pérez, & Enesco, 2019; Ronfard, Lane, Wang, Harris, 2017). This focus 
makes sense given that much of what children learn from testimony would be difficult or even 
impossible for them to verify on their own. It is difficult to imagine how a young child (or even 
an adult!) might seek empirical evidence about the existence of germs, angels, the shape of the 
earth, the movement of heavenly bodies, or the fall of the Roman Empire. There are, however, 
many claims that can be empirically tested. For example, if presented with equal-sized cubes and 
told that some will float and others will sink, children could easily test that claim and learn about 
the role of density through observation. While we know quite a bit about children’s exploration 
following their observation of surprising events (for review see Schulz, 2012), we know very 
little about their response to surprising claims. Do young children seize opportunities to explore 
surprising claims or do they simply acquiesce to what they have been told?  
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In an initial study of this question, Ronfard, Chen, and Harris (2018) presented Chinese 
preschool and elementary school children with five different-sized Russian dolls and asked them 
to indicate the heaviest doll. As might be expected, almost all children were guided by perceptual 
clues and pointed to the biggest doll. Half of the children then heard a counter-intuitive (and 
false) claim (i.e., “Actually, the smallest doll is the heaviest”). The remaining children heard a 
claim confirming their initial intuition (i.e., “Yes, the biggest doll is the heaviest”). Across ages, 
children typically endorsed the experimenter’s claim even when it was counter-intuitive. 
However, a developmental difference in children’s subsequent behavior was clear when the 
experimenter left the room – preschool children rarely explored the objects, no matter what claim 
the experimenter had made. By contrast, elementary school children explored the dolls more if 
the experimenter had made a counter-intuitive claim (as opposed to a claim that confirmed their 
intuition). Thus, at least among Chinese preschoolers, the spontaneous testing of counter-
intuitive claims develops slowly: when presented with a claim that conflicts with their intuitions, 
older children evaluate and test it whereas younger children acquiesce, a pattern consistent with 
developments in children’s epistemological thinking, for example their understanding that 
factual claims are verifiable, and their ability to design an experiment (Butler, Schmidt, 
Tavassolie, & Gibbs, 2018; Chen & Klahr, 1999; Koerber & Osterhaus, 2019; Osterhaus, 
Koerber, & Sodian, 2017). 
In the current study, we conducted a replication of Ronfard et al. (2018) to test whether 
the lack of spontaneous first-hand exploration following a surprising claim observed in Chinese 
preschoolers is also observed in countries that differ sharply from mainland China: Belarus and 
Turkey. Belarus and Turkey provide an interesting context to examine whether young children 
endorse and empirically examine adult claims that are in conflict with their first-hand 
TESTING COUNTERINTUITIVE CLAIMS 
 5 
observation. Belarus’ history as a mostly agrarian society and as a member of the Soviet Union 
means that its citizens endorse conformity, respect for authority, and self-reliance. However, 
Belarusian society is also connected to Western Europe and its developing national identity 
prizes individualism (Radzik, 2001). In Turkey, the global spread of urbanization, formal 
schooling, and socioeconomic development lead Turkish families to adopt a dialectical synthesis 
of traditional and individualistic values (Kağıtçıbaşı, 1990; 2005). Children’s financial 
contribution to the family is no longer important but parents still preserve their traditional values 
and psychological interdependence between generations continues. In this regard, showing 
respect for elders and deference to authority are still highly valued and children are socialized to 
hold adults’ wishes and opinions in high esteem.  
Given the tension between independence and respect for authority in both countries, we 
collected information about parents’ endorsement of authoritarian values within each sample to 
look at whether individual differences in children’s endorsement of counterintuitive claims and 
their exploration of such claims is associated with their parents’ socialization goals (Reifen 
Tagar, et al., 2014). Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that preschool children growing up in 
more authoritarian families may be less likely to seize an opportunity to test an adult’s surprising 
claim than children growing up in less authoritarian families because of the greater respect for 
authority instilled in them by their parents.  
In sum, the current study seeks to replicate and extend the earlier findings with Chinese 
preschoolers by Ronfard et al. (2018) in two distinct cultures. In doing so, the study would 
extend the generalizability of the results beyond the Chinese context and offer an opportunity to 
probe the impact of parental socialization goals on children’s exploration – as indexed by the 
extent to which parents endorse authoritarian values. Finally, by replicating the method and 
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analyses of Ronfard et al. (2018) in Turkey and Belarus, the findings will strengthen the 
scientific record (Zwaan, Etz, Lucas, & Donnellan, 2017) and contribute important data from 
populations usually ignored by developmental researchers (Nielsen, Haun, Kärtner, & Legare, 
2017), i.e., populations that are not from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and 
Democratic societies (Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan, 2010)  
Experiment 1: Belarus 
 
Data availability 
The data and syntax files for this study are openly available at the Open Science 
Framework at https://osf.io/wsbuh/?view_only=94e064017cd2414584a60387b2702e98. 
Participants  
 
We recruited a total of 86 children from 3 preschools in the city of Minsk, Belarus. Our 
sample size was designed to match the preschool sample from Ronfard et al. (2018) (which was 
comprised of 81 children) after accounting for attrition. Of these 86 children, 12 children were 
recruited but not included in our analyses because of equipment failure or experimenter error (n 
= 7) or because children lifted the dolls prior to the experimenter leaving the room (n = 4). Thus, 
our final sample was composed of 74 children (44 female; Mage = 4.70, SD = .74, Range = 2.98 
to 5.85) (School 1, n = 25; School 2, n = 38; School 3, n = 11). Preliminary analyses revealed no 
effect of school on our results. 
We randomly assigned children to two conditions: counter-intuitive testimony and 
confirming testimony and then to either a prime to explore or no prime to explore (see Table 1 
for descriptive statistics). We obtained a sample that was relatively diverse in family 
background. Parents reported on the level of education that they and their partner had completed 
(72 out of 74, or 97% of parents answered this question) and on their income level (71 out of 74, 
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or 96% of parents answered this question). Of the parents who responded, 25% reported that 
neither parent had earned a college degree and 75% reported that at least one parent had earned a 
college degree. Parents reported having:  a higher-income level (1%), a middle-income level 
(86%), a lower-income level (1%), or did not want to report their income level (12%). The 
surveys were mostly completed by children’s mothers (86% mothers and 14% fathers).  
This study was approved by the Ethics Committees of XXXX (IRB#1242). Parents of 
participants gave informed consent in writing before children participated in the study and 
children gave verbal assent.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics by condition (Belarus). 
 
 Counter-Intuitive Testimony Confirming Testimony 
Prime 
N = 20, 11 girls 
Mage = 4.59, SD = .76 
Age Range = 3.21 to 5.85 
N = 17, 10 girls 
Mage = 4.89, SD = .58  
Age Range = 3.95 to 5.77 
No Prime 
N = 21, 12 girls 
Mage = 4.67, SD = .85  
Age Range = 2.98 to 5.69 
N = 16, 11 girls 
Mage = 4.68, SD = .72  




 We used five, different-sized, Russian nesting dolls; each doll was attached to a square 
base for stability. Size and weight were correlated – the smallest doll was the lightest, and the 
biggest doll was the heaviest. The dolls and their bases were painted white.  They were arranged 
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on a tray placed on the table so that the biggest doll was on the child’s left and the smallest doll 
was on the child’s right (Figure 1). The experimenter and the child sat next to each other at the 
table. The dolls were approximately 18" from the table edge nearest to the child. The 








The six-phase procedure for this study was identical to that used by Ronfard et al. (2018). 
Children were individually tested in a separate room at their school by a female Belarusian 
experimenter fluent in Russian – the native language of the children and the language used in the 
school. 
Initial Judgment. The experimenter asked children to point to the heaviest doll: “Which 
doll do you think is the heaviest?” Children were then asked an open-ended question inviting 
them to explain their judgment: “You think this one is the heaviest – why do you think it is the 
heaviest?”  
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Testimony. Children were randomly assigned to receive either counter-intuitive testimony 
(i.e., smallest = heaviest) or testimony that confirmed their intuition (i.e., biggest = heaviest). In 
the counter-intuitive testimony condition, the experimenter told children: “Actually, that one is 
not the heaviest; this one here (pointing to the smallest one on the right) is the heaviest. It is 
heavier than all of the other ones. It’s heavier than this one, this one, this one, this one (starting 
with the biggest one and moving to the second smallest one).”  Note that this statement was false 
because, fully consistent with the appearance of the dolls, the smallest doll was the lightest and 
the biggest doll was the heaviest. In the confirming testimony condition, the experimenter told 
children: “Yes, that one is the heaviest, and this one here (pointing to the smallest one on the 
right) is the lightest. This one (pointing to the biggest one) is heavier than all of the other ones. It 
is heavier than this one, this one, this one, and this one (starting with the second largest one and 
moving to the smallest one)”.  
Post-testimony judgment. Children were again asked to identify the heaviest doll and to 
provide an explanation for their judgment using the same wording as for the initial judgment: 
“Which doll do you think is the heaviest?” Children were also asked to recall which doll the 
experimenter had identified as the heaviest: “Can you point to the one I said was the heaviest?”  
Opportunity to explore the dolls. For children in the no prime condition, the experimenter 
then told children that she was going next door to use her phone for a moment but that she would 
come right back. For children assigned to the prime condition, she added, just before leaving: 
“I’ll move the dolls a bit closer to you” and pushed the tray so that the dolls were about 6 inches 
from the child. She then walked out of the room and returned after 60 seconds.  
Opportunity to report exploration to the experimenter. Once the experimenter returned, 
she said, “Let’s see – we were talking about the dolls,” and paused for 10 seconds to offer 
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children an opportunity to initiate a conversation with her following their opportunity to explore 
the dolls. If children did not spontaneously comment, she prompted children: “Okay, we’re 
almost done. Is there anything you want to tell me?”  
Final judgment. Children were again asked to identify the heaviest doll and to provide an 
explanation for their judgment using the same wording as the initial judgment.  
Coding  
To investigate children’s exploration, we coded from video how many times each child 
picked up each of the five dolls. Two research assistants, blind to the hypotheses of the study, 
coded 100% of the videos for children’s exploration of the doll. Both coders were also blind to 
children’s age, condition, and judgments about the dolls. Inter-rater agreement, as measured by 
Cohen’s Kappa (κ) for each doll, was excellent: smallest doll, κ = .90; second smallest doll, κ = 
.93; middle doll, κ = .83; second biggest doll, κ = .89; biggest doll, κ = .94. 
Measure of parent’s endorsement of authoritarian values  
 
 Parents were asked to indicate in four forced-choice items which of two child-rearing 
values (authoritarian vs. non-authoritarian) they found more important (Feldman & Stenner, 
1997; Stenner, 2005). The value pairs were “independence” versus “respect for elders,” 
“obedience” versus “self-reliance,” “curiosity” versus “good manners,” and “being considerate” 
versus “[being] well-behaved.” After scoring (authoritarian response = 1, non-authoritarian 
response = 0), responses were averaged to run from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating a 
stronger authoritarian predisposition. When parents did not complete all four items, a pro-rated 
score based on the number of items completed was created. Responses were obtained from 67 
out of 74 parents (91%), M = .29, SD = .34, Range = 0 to 1. The reliability of the scale,
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computed based on the 44 children for whom parents had answered all four questions, was 
Cronbach’s Alpha (𝛼) =	.37. 
Results 
We analyze children’s: (i) initial and post-testimony weight judgments; (ii) exploration of 
the dolls; (iii) post-exploration weight judgments; (iv) and post-exploration weight judgments as 
a function of children’s exploration. Neither parental authoritarianism nor children’s age 
predicted variability in children’s judgements and exploration; details of these analyses can be 
found in supplementary online materials.  
Children’s initial and post-testimony weight judgments  
 As Table 2 shows, all children initially stated, as expected, that the biggest doll was the 
heaviest. Analysis of children’s explanations confirmed that children associated greater size with 
greater weight: 77% of children mentioned size as a justification of their selection whereas the 
remaining children either did not provide an explanation (19%) or provided an explanation 
unrelated to the size of the dolls (4%).   
Among those children who heard testimony confirming their initial judgment, 32 of 33 
children continued to make same judgment post-testimony and one child failed to provide a 
response, McNemar Test (Binomial test for this and all subsequent tests) = 1.0. In contrast, 
among children who heard testimony conflicting with their initial judgment only 5 of 41 
continued to make the same judgment post-testimony and two children failed to provide a 
response. Thus, few children persisted with their initial judgment in the counter-intuitive 
testimony condition, McNemar Test, 𝑝	< .001. They justified their response by simply repeating 
what they had been told (44%, “The smallest is the heaviest”), failed to provide a justification 
(41%), or provided other unrelated explanations (15%, e.g., “It’s the middle one”). Comparing 
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across conditions, children who received counter-intuitive testimony endorsed the biggest doll as 
the heaviest significantly less often than children who received confirming testimony, χ2(1, N = 
71) = 53.53, p < .001, Cramér’s V = .86. Thus, the type of testimony children received markedly 
affected their identification of the heaviest doll.  
  
Table 2. Percentage of Belarusian children in each condition who claimed that the biggest doll 
was the heaviest at three successive time-points. 
Timing of Judgment Confirming 
(N = 33) 
Counter 
(N = 41) 
Initial 100% 100% 
Post-Testimony  100% 13% 
Post-Opportunity to Spontaneously Explore 97% 27% 
 
Children’s exploration of the dolls 
In Figure 2, we display the mean number of times children picked up each doll by 
condition. We conducted a mixed ANOVA with the between-subject factors of Testimony Type 
(2: Counter-Intuitive vs. Confirming), and Priming (2: Prime vs. no Prime), and the within-
subject factor of Doll (5: one [i.e., smallest], two, three, four, and five [i.e., biggest]) on the 
number of times children picked up a doll. This analysis revealed an effect of Doll, F (4, 280) = 
3.59, p = .007, η2p = .05. Children tended to pick up the smallest and the biggest dolls more 
frequently than the dolls of intermediate sizes. Critically, however, there was no effect of 
Testimony or of receiving a Prime or significant interactions. By implication, counter-intuitive 
testimony did not provoke Belarusian preschool children to test the experimenter’s claim. This 
lack of selective exploration does not seem to reflect shyness on the part of children. Children 
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rarely explored the dolls even when they were primed to explore and had received testimony that 
the smallest = heaviest. Indeed, the percentage of children who picked up at least one doll was 
low across all conditions: Counter Testimony No Prompt = 33% (7 out of 21); Counter 
Testimony Prompt = 25% (5 out of 20); Confirming Testimony No Prompt = 13% (2 out of 16); 
Confirming Testimony Prompt = 29% (5 out of 17).     
 
 
Figure 2.  Number of times each doll was picked up by Belarusian preschoolers when the 
experimenter left the room by condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Confirming Testimony Condition (N = 33). Counter Testimony Condition (N = 41).  
 
























Confirming Testimony Counter Testimony
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Following the return of the experimenter, few children in the counterintuitive and 
confirming testimony conditions commented on the weight of the dolls or on the fact that they 
had picked up the dolls (see supplementary materials). When the experimenter asked children to 
identify the heaviest doll a final time, a clear condition emerged (Table 2). Children who had 
received testimony confirming their intuitions that the biggest doll was the heaviest continued to 
claim that the biggest doll was the heaviest. There was a modest change in children’s 
endorsement of the smallest = heaviest in the counterintuitive testimony condition, but this fell 
short of significance, McNemar Test, 𝑝	= .07. Moreover, at the end of the experiment, the type of 
testimony children had received continued to markedly affect their judgments of the doll’s 
weights, χ2(1, N = 71) = 36.95, p < .001, Cramér’s V = .71.  
Post-exploration weight judgments as a function of children’s exploration 
 To provide a more targeted assessment of whether children’s exploration impacted their 
subsequent weight judgments, we analyzed those judgments as a function of whether children 
had explored the dolls in the experimenter’s absence, restricting our analysis to children who had 
received counter-intuitive testimony. Following the coding scheme of Ronfard et al. (2018), we 
operationalized exploration as children’s decision to lift the biggest and the smallest doll (picked 
up one after another, i.e., not simultaneously). As compared to children who did not explore in 
this fashion, a greater percentage of children who did explore stated that the biggest doll was the 
heaviest on their final judgments (23% vs. 40%) but this difference was not statistically 
significant, χ2(1, N = 41) = 1.17, p = .28, Cramér’s V = .17.  
Study 1: Summary 
 Overall, these data indicate that preschool children in Belarus, like their peers in China 
(Ronfard et al., 2018), used perceptual clues to infer that the biggest doll was the heaviest doll. 
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Nevertheless, when provided with a claim running counter to that intuition, most children 
accepted that claim. In addition, they were no more likely to seek out empirical evidence 
following that counterintuitive claim than following a claim confirming their intuitions. When 
surveying the overall pattern of children’s responses across the successive steps of the 
experimental procedure in the counterintuitive condition only, four groups emerged. The 
majority of children (54%, n = 22) endorsed the experimenter’s claim, did not test it, and 
continued to endorse it at posttest. Another 15% (n = 6) of children, did not test the 
experimenter’s claim but vacillated in their endorsement of it, for example endorsing it 
immediately after hearing it but not when the experimenter returned to the room or vice versa. A 
very small group of children (7%, n = 3) were skeptical of the claim initially (did not endorse it), 
but did not test it, and did not endorse it on the experimenter’s return. The last group of children 
(25%, n = 10) did check the experimenter’s claim by investigating the dolls but fewer than half 
of those children (i.e., only 10%, n = 4, of the children in the counter-intuitive condition) went on 
to state that the biggest doll was the heaviest when the experimenter returned to the room.  
In Experiment 2, we tested Turkish preschoolers on the same task with one noteworthy 
addition. To assess whether Turkish preschoolers truly believed the experimenter’s claim that the 
smallest doll was the heaviest, we presented children with a large candy bar on one side of a 
balance scale. We told children that only a very heavy object could lift the candy bar and told 
them that if they selected a doll heavy enough to lift the candy bar they would be able to keep it. 
We reasoned that if children were simply pretending to endorse the claim that the smallest doll 
was the heaviest then they would be significantly more likely to select the biggest doll on this 
task relative to the prior task when the experimenter asked them which doll was the heaviest. 
Experiment 2: Turkey 
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Data availability 
The data and syntax files for this study are openly available at the Open Science 
Framework at https://osf.io/wsbuh/?view_only=94e064017cd2414584a60387b2702e98. 
Participants  
 
We recruited a total of 89 children from 6 preschools in the city of Kayseri, Turkey. Our 
sample size was designed to match the preschool sample from Ronfard et al. (2018) (which was 
comprised of 81 children) after accounting for attrition. Of these 89 children, 10 children were 
not included in our analyses: 2 because of experimenter error, 2 because they did not initially 
identify the biggest doll as the heaviest, and 6 because of equipment failure. As a result, our final 
sample was composed of 79 children (42 girls; Mage = 4.42, SD = .70, Range = 3.14 to 6.00) 
(School 1, n = 25; School 2, n = 18; School 3, n = 15; School 4, n = 13; School 5, n = 5; School 
6, n = 3). Preliminary analyses revealed no effect of school on our results. We randomly assigned 
children to two conditions: counter-intuitive testimony and confirming testimony (see Table 3 for 
descriptive statistics). Given the absence of any effect of prompt in Study 1, we did not assign 
children to different prompt conditions in Study 2. 
We obtained a sample that was relatively highly educated in family background. All 
parents reported on the level of education they and their partner had completed, and on their 
monthly expenses (as a proxy for family income). We made the decision to ask about monthly 
expenses rather than family income because Turkish families were hesitant to give information 
about their income level. Of the parents who responded: 10% reported that neither parent had 
completed college, 84% reported at least one parent had a college degree and 6% reported that at 
least one parent had a graduate degree (Master or Doctorate). Parents were also asked to report 
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on their monthly expenses (minimum wage at the time of testing was 2000 Turkish Liras): 5000 
or more (48%), 3000 to 5000 (32%), 1200 to 3000 (19%), less than 650 (1%). 
This study was approved by the Ethics Committees of XXXX University (IRB#1242). 
Parents of participants gave informed consent in writing before children participated in the study 
and children gave verbal assent. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics by condition (Study 2 – Turkey). 
 
Counter-Intuitive Testimony Confirming Testimony 
N = 39, 21 girls 
Mage = 4.41, SD = .65 
Age Range = 3.28 to 5.95 
N = 40, 21 girls 
Mage = 4.43, SD = .75  
Age Range = 3.14 to 6.00 
 
Procedure 
 The procedure for this study was identical to Ronfard et al. (2018) and to Experiment 1. 
Children were individually tested in a separate room at their school by a female Turkish 
experimenter fluent in Turkish. As before, the experimental procedure consisted of six phases. 
However, at the end of these 6 phases, an additional phase was added – a balance scale task (See 
Figure 3). Children were presented with a balance scale and were told: “I have a fun game for 
you to play. This is a scale. On this side, there is a box with candy. To get the candy you have to 
put the heaviest doll on this side so that it lifts the box of candy that is on this side. If it is not 
heavy, it will not lift the box of candy and you won’t get any candy. You will get the candy, if 
you put something very heavy here that lifts the candy on this side.” Children were then asked to 
confirm that they understood the point of the game: “OK, so what do you need to do to get the 
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candy in this box?” If they correctly answered, they were told: “Right, you need to put something 
very heavy on this side.” If they responded incorrectly, the game was explained to them again 
and the confirmation question was asked a second time. Children were then asked to select a 
doll: “OK, go ahead. Put the doll you think is the heaviest on this side.” The doll they selected 
was then placed on the balance scale so children could observe whether it was heavy enough. 
Note that only the biggest doll was heavy enough to tip the scale. If the child did not select the 
biggest doll, they were given another turn: “OK, it looks like this doll was not heavy enough. Go 
ahead and try another doll”.  
 
Figure 3. Balance scale similar to the one used in the final phase of Experiment 2.  
Coding  
The same coding scheme as in Experiment 1 was used to code children’s exploration of 
the dolls. Two research assistants, blind to the hypotheses of the study, coded 100% of the videos 
for children’s exploration of the doll. Both coders were blind to children’s age, condition, and 
judgments about the dolls. Inter-rater agreement as measured by Cohen’s Kappa (κ) was 
excellent for each doll: smallest doll, κ = .84; second smallest doll, κ = 1.00; middle doll, κ = 
1.00; second biggest doll, κ = .89; biggest doll, κ = .95. 
Measure of parent’s endorsement of authoritarian values  
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 The same measure of parental authoritarianism described in Study 1 was used for Study 
2. Responses were obtained from 74 out of 79 parents (94%), M = .38, SD = .28, Range = 0 to 1. 
The reliability of the scale computed based on the 74 children for whom parents had answered all 
four questions was Cronbach’s Alpha (𝛼) =	.39. 
Results 
We analyze children’s: (i) initial and post-testimony weight judgments; (ii) exploration of 
the dolls; (iii) post-exploration weight judgments; (iv) and post-exploration weight judgments as 
a function of children’s exploration; (v) children’s doll selection on the balance scale task. As in 
Study 1, our analyses indicated that parental authoritarianism and children’s age did not predict 
variability in children’s judgements and exploration. Details of these analyses can be found in 
supplementary online materials. 
Children’s initial and post-testimony weight judgments  
 As Table 4 shows, all children initially stated that the biggest doll was the heaviest. 
Analysis of children’s explanations confirmed that children associated greater size with greater 
weight: 59% of children mentioned size as a justification of their selection of the biggest doll as 
the heaviest while the remaining children either did not provide an explanation (9%) or provided 
an explanation unrelated to the size of the dolls (32%).  
When asked to make the post-testimony judgment, all but 3 children (90%) who heard 
testimony that confirmed their initial judgment made the same judgment, McNemar Test,  𝑝	= 
.25. In contrast, very few of the children (4 out of 39) who heard testimony that conflicted with 
their initial judgment continued to make the same judgment, McNemar	Test, 𝑝	< .001. The 
majority now stated that the smallest was the heaviest. Just over half of these children justified 
their response by simply repeating what they had been told (51.5%, “The smallest is the 
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heaviest”). The remaining children either did not provide a justification (11.5%) or provided a 
justification unrelated to the testimony they received (27%, e.g., “It came to my mind”). Children 
who received counter-intuitive testimony endorsed the biggest doll as the heaviest significantly 
less often than children who received confirming testimony, χ2(1, N = 79) = 53.50, p < .001, 
Cramér’s V = .82. Thus, the type of testimony children received markedly affected their post-
testimony judgments of the dolls’ weights.  
 
Table 4. Percentage of Turkish children in each condition who claimed that the biggest doll was 
the heaviest at six successive time-points.  
Timing of Judgment Confirming Counter 
Initial 100% 
(n = 40) 
100% 
(n = 39) 
Post-Testimony 93% 
(n = 40) 
10% 
(n = 39) 
Post-Opportunity to Spontaneously Explore 98% 
(n = 40) 
28% 
(n = 39) 
Balance Task – 1st attempt  95% 
(n = 40) 
33% 
(n = 39) 
Balance Task – 2nd attempt (n = 27) 100% 
(n = 2) 
64% 
(n = 25) 
After both attempts (n = 79) 100% 
(n = 40) 
77% 
(n = 39) 
Note. One child in the counterintuitive testimony condition who did not select the biggest doll on 
the first attempt did not complete the second attempt. Thus, 25 out of the 26 children the 
counterintuitive testimony condition who did not select the biggest doll in the first attempt 
completed the second attempt. 
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Children’s exploration of the dolls 
In Figure 4, we display the mean number of times children picked up each doll by 
condition. We conducted a mixed ANOVA with the between-subject factors of Testimony Type 
(2: Counter-Intuitive vs. Confirming) and the within-subject factor of Doll (5: one [i.e., smallest], 
two, three, four, and five [i.e., biggest]) on the number of times children picked up a doll. This 
analysis revealed an effect of Doll, F (4, 308) = 10.28, p < .001, η2p = .12. Children lifted the 
smallest and the biggest dolls at equal rates but lifted both more frequently than the dolls of 
intermediate sizes, all p < .038. Critically, however, there was no effect of Testimony and no 
interaction of Testimony X Doll. Counter-intuitive testimony did not provoke Turkish preschool 
children to test the experimenter’s claim by lifting the dolls more often. The percentage of 
children who picked up at least one doll was low across both conditions: Counter Testimony = 
49% (19 out of 39); Confirming Testimony = 50% (20 out of 40).     
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Figure 4.  Number of times each doll was picked up by Turkish preschoolers when the 
experimenter left the room by condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Confirming Testimony Condition (N = 40). Counter Testimony Condition (N = 39). 
 
Post-exploration weight judgments  
Following the return of the experimenter, few children in the counterintuitive and 
confirming testimony conditions commented on the weight of the dolls or on the fact that they 
had picked up the dolls (see supplementary materials). When the experimenter asked children 
about the weight of the doll a final time, a clear effect of condition emerged. Children who had 
received testimony confirming their intuition that the biggest doll was the heaviest continued to 
endorse the biggest doll as the heaviest in the post-exploration phase. In contrast, although the 
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endorse that testimony in the post-exploration phase, more children claimed that biggest = 
heaviest at the end of the experiment than did so immediately after having received the counter-
intuitive testimony, McNemar	Test, 𝑝	= .039. Nevertheless, in the post-exploration phase, the 
type of testimony children had received continued to markedly affect their judgments of the 
doll’s weights, χ2(1, N = 79) = 40.81, p < .001, Cramér’s V = .72.  
Post-exploration weight judgments as a function of children’s exploration 
 To provide a more targeted assessment of whether children’s exploration impacted their 
subsequent weight judgments, we analyzed those judgments as a function of whether they had 
explored the dolls in the experimenter’s absence, restricting our analysis to children who had 
received counter-intuitive testimony. We again operationalized exploration as children’s decision 
to pick up the biggest and the smallest doll at some point during the experimenters’ absence. As 
compared to children who did not explore, a greater percentage of children who did explore 
stated that the biggest doll was the heaviest on their final judgments (18% vs. 55%), χ2(1, N = 
39) = 5.25, p = .022, Cramér’s V = .37.  
Children’s doll selection on the balance scale task  
 At the end of the interview, children were told that they would earn a bag of candy if they 
selected a doll heavy enough to lift a bag of candy on the balance scale. Choosing the biggest 
doll was coded as 1 while choosing any other doll was coded as 0. On their first attempt, 
children’s selection of which doll to put on the scale differed significantly by condition. Almost 
all children in the confirming testimony condition selected the biggest doll whereas only a third 
of children who had received counterintuitive testimony did so, 95% vs. 33%, χ2(1, N = 79) = 
32.82, p < .001, Cramér’s V = .64. Of the 26 children in the counterintuitive condition (67% of 
children in that condition) who did not select the biggest doll, 23 selected the smallest doll – the 
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doll the experimenter had claimed was the heaviest.  Children who did not initially select the 
biggest doll and thus were not able to earn the bag of candy were given a second chance. 
Importantly, these children now had evidence that the smaller doll they had selected was not 
heavy enough and could use this evidence to change their selection for their second attempt. By 
the end of this second round, 100% of the children in the confirming testimony condition had 
selected the biggest doll. In contrast, by the end of the second round 23% of children in the 
counterintuitive testimony condition still had not selected the biggest doll (Table 4).  
Study 2: Summary 
 Preschool children in Turkey, like their peers in Belarus (Study 1) and China (Ronfard et 
al., 2018), are no more likely to seek out empirical evidence following a counterintuitive claim 
than following a claim that confirms their intuitions. Indeed, when looking at the pattern of 
children’s responses in the counterintuitive condition only (N = 39), Turkish children look very 
similar to Belarusian children. The majority (56%, n = 22) endorsed the experimenter’s 
testimony, did not test it, and continued to endorse it at posttest; 10% (n = 4) of children did not 
test the experimenter’s claim but vacillated in their endorsement of it. A very small group of 
children (5%, n = 2) were skeptical of the claim initially (did not endorse it), did not test it, and 
did not endorse it on the experimenter’s return. The last group of children (28%, n = 11) did 
assess the experimenter’s claim by exploring the dolls with about half of those children stating 
that biggest = heaviest (i.e., only 15 %, n = 6 of the children in the counter-intuitive condition) 
when the experimenter returned to the room.  
Discussion 
Do preschool children seize opportunities to empirically examine surprising claims – 
claims that run counter to their intuitions? To answer this question, we conducted a replication of 
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Ronfard, Chen, and Harris (2018, conducted in the People’s Republic of China) in Belarus and 
Turkey. Replicating prior work, we found that most children endorsed the counterintuitive claim 
that the smallest doll was the heaviest (Belarus = 87%; Turkey = 90%) and did not 
spontaneously investigate it by picking up the dolls in the experimenter’s absence (Belarus = 
75%; Turkey = 72%). Extending prior work, we found that children continued to endorse the 
claim that the biggest doll was the heaviest even at a potential cost to themselves: When asked to 
select a doll that would be heavy enough to lift a large bag of candy, the majority of Turkish 
children selected the smallest doll. However, on subsequent attempts they often switched to 
selecting the biggest doll. By implication, preschool children can update their belief in the 
experimenter’s claim when faced with empirical evidence contracting that claim. However, they 
do not appear to spontaneously seek out such evidence. Also extending prior work, we found that 
whether or not children tested the experimenter’s claim was unrelated to their parents’ 
endorsement of authoritarian beliefs (Experiment 1 and 2). In sum, across diverse countries, 
preschool children generally accept, and are willing to act on the basis of, an adult’s surprising 
claim without testing the truth of that claim. Why?  
One reason for preschool children’s apparent credulity may be the nature of claim. 
Weight is an invisible property. Children do not have direct perceptual access to it. Moreover, 
although preschool children expect bigger objects to be heavier, they also know that some small 
objects can be heavy and that some big objects can be light. Our claim was moderately 
counterintuitive and this likely contributed to children’s endorsement of it (see Lane, 2018 for a 
review). Yet, by itself, the nature of the claim cannot explain why, unlike preschool children, 
elementary school children engage in empirical testing of that claim (Ronfard, Chen, Harris, 
2018; under review). 
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One explanation for the age-related difference in children’s spontaneous exploration of 
the informant’s claim is that preschool and elementary school children differ in their perception 
of the informant’s reliability. Unlike preschool children, elementary school children likely 
understand that speakers sometimes make false claims – because they are being ironic, cynical, 
or mendacious (Filippova & Astington, 2008; Mills & Kiel, 2005; Peterson, Wellman & 
Slaughter, 2012; Talwar & Lee, 2008) or alternatively because their representation of the world 
is mistaken (Astington, Pelletier, & Homer, 2002). As a result, elementary school children may 
take a more cautious approach to surprising claims than preschool children. If age-related 
differences in children’s empirical testing are a result of differences in children’s perceptions of 
informant reliability, then preschool children’s empirical testing should increase when they are 
faced with an informant who is clearly unsure about his or her claim, “I know” vs. “I think but 
I’m unsure”.  
An alternative or additional reason for the lack of empirical testing of counterintuitive 
claims by preschoolers is that testing a counterintuitive claim requires children to reason through 
the empirical implications of the claim and to realize how those implications could be checked 
and potentially falsified. Effectively, our task may tap into children’s developing ability to 
design unconfounded experiments – a skill that emerges around the elementary school years 
(Chen & Klahr, 1999) and that is related to developments in children’s epistemological thinking 
(Koerber & Osterhaus, 2019; Osterhaus, et al., 2017). Indeed, it may be that the spontaneous 
decision to test a counterintuitive claim necessitates an understanding that factual claims are 
verifiable (Butler, et al., 2018).  
So far, we have only considered two cognitive explanations for preschool children’s 
failure to test the experimenter’s claim. However, it is possible that preschoolers simply did not 
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feel that it was appropriate to carry out such a test. After all, children are often told not to touch 
things that do not belong to them. However, this explanation faces two challenges. First, 
receiving a prime to explore did not increase exploration by preschool children who received 
counterintuitive testimony in Belarus (Experiment 1), Hong Kong, the United States (Ronfard, 
Chen, & Harris, under review), and China (Ronfard, Chen, & Harris, 2018). However, it did 
impact the empirical testing of elementary school children in the United States and Hong Kong 
(Ronfard, Chen, & Harris, under review). By implication, only elementary school children’s 
empirical testing seems to be inhibited by concerns about permissibility – their exploration 
increases when they are prompted to explore, but this is not the case for preschool children. 
Second, parental authoritarianism was not associated with preschool children’s exploration of the 
experimenter’s claim in Belarus, Turkey, the United States, and Hong Kong (Ronfard, Chen, & 
Harris, under review) but it was associated with the empirical testing of elementary school 
children in the United States and Hong Kong (Ronfard et al., under review). Thus, while the low 
reliability of the parental authoritarianism scale is a concern and warrants additional research, it 
does predict empirical testing by older children. This suggests that sociocultural factors and 
children’s belief that they are allowed to test the claim do influence children’s empirical testing 
but apparently only after they have developed the cognitive resources necessary to doubt such 
claims, as proposed in the preceding paragraph. Thus, researchers interested in how parents and 
schools influence children’s responses to counterintuitive claims should consider investigating 
such effects with older children. For example, researchers might investigate whether pedagogy 
that emphasizes children’s independent learning (as in Montessori and Reggio Emilia schools) 
rather than their trust in a teachers’ testimony, is associated with increased empirical testing of 
informants’ claims. 
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In sum, we asked: do preschool children seize opportunities to empirically check 
counterintuitive claims or do they simply acquiesce to what they have been told? Across diverse 
cultures, they acquiesce. Future work will need to investigate the breadth of this effect as well as 
its underlying cause. Paradoxically, it may turn out that young children’s failure to seek 
empirical evidence following counterintuitive claims is adaptive rather than maladaptive. It 
allows them to quickly accept opaque, hard-to-discover, and counterintuitive information from 
teachers and caregivers. Children who insisted on empirically checking every counterintuitive 
claim before accepting its veracity might display the type of cognitive autonomy eulogized by 
Rousseau in his classic account of Emile’s education, but such children would be stubborn 
misfits from a pedagogical standpoint.  
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